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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-19,9-1950
but represented a deliberate act of the legislature to extend the
benefit of the section to any person, minor or adult, who had
been validly adopted under the laws of a sister state.
VI. PROPERTY
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.
There is little of truly startling news to report concerning
developments in the law of real property, but some new points
have been made. Scientific progress which has been made in ex-
tracting crude oil from the earth produced one new problem.
The practice of using re-pressuring methods to increase produc-
tion from wells where the natural flow of oil has declined because
of the exhaustion of original gas pressures is common enough to
be recognized as conforming with reasonably prudent and com-
petent operating procedures, but the right to the lessor of an oil
interest to oppose such activities remained undecided until raised
in the case of Carter Oil Company v. Dees.1  The plaintiff-lessee
there desired to convert an offset well on the defendant's property
into a gas input well so as to restore pressure. Defendant had
objected on the ground that the proposed action would cause a
migration of oil underlying his property to the land of others.
It was true that the oil driven off would be replaced by a return
flow which could then be captured at a large profit to himself,
but the lessor preferred, perhaps for tax reasons, to continue the
traditional mode of production without the proposed re-pressur-
ing.2 The oil lease was silent as to methods of production, but the
Appellate Court for the Fourth District found for the plaintiff
in a declaratory judg-ment proceeding, stating that the conversion
would not deprive the lessor of any portion of his royalty and
1340 Ill. App. 449, 92 N. E. (2d) 519 (1950). Culbertson, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
2 It more frequently happens that it is the lessor who seeks to compel more
intensive and diligent operation by the lessee. It would appear to be a rare case
in which it is the lessee who is faced with the owner's objection to the use of
modern techniques.
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that the new method of production could not be rejected because
of its novelty.
3
Another oil case, one involving the character of the title con-
veyed by the state to the Illinois Central Railroad Company under
the famous checkerboard grants of 1850, came before the federal
district court in United States v. Illinois Central Railroad Com-
pany.4 The government there sought to enjoin the railroad from
extracting oil and !as from certain parts of its right of way not
used for railroad purposes on the ground that only an easement
had been granted to the common carrier. The court held that the
railroad had been given a base or limited fee, subject only to an
implied condition of reverter. Such limited fee, of course, carried
with it the title to minerals underlying the surface of the property
conveyed as well as the right to open new mines or drill new wells.
Draftsmen of restrictive covenants should take note of the
Appellate Court decision in Leverich v. Roy.5 Confronted with
the problem of construing a covenant which restricted building on
a lot to "a private dwelling house " and to a "one dwelling house, "
the court concluded that the alteration of a two-story brick home
into a two-flat apartment building did not constitute a violation
of the covenant. The value of such a clause becomes doubtful
in view of the construction placed upon it. One might well wonder
what else the parties could have intended if it was not that the
structure was to be confined to a single family dwelling.
Only two decisions affecting the law of future interests would
seem to be noteworthy. In Beasley v. Beasley,6 property had
been deeded to "Lottie A. Beasley and her Bodley Heirs." The
heirs of Lottie claimed the estate as remaindermen on the theory
that the interest created by the grant was, in essence, a fee tail
which, by Illinois law,7 operated to provide a life estate in favor
3 Culbertson, J., in his dissenting opinion, took the position that the majority
had inserted a covenant into the lease which the parties did not intend. In addi-
tion, he regarded the draining off of the lessor's oil as a clear invasion of his
property right to the oil under his land.
4 89 F. Supp. 17 (1949).
5338 Ill. App. 248, 87 N. E. (2d) 226 (1949).
6 404 Ill. 225, 88 N. E. (2d) 435 (1949).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 5, is essentially a re-enactment of R. S.
1874, Ch. 30, § 6, in effect at the time the deed involved was executed. The pro-
visions concerning fee tail estates, in effect then, were the same as now.
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of the named grantee and a fee simple absolute, by way of re-
mainder, for the heirs of her body. The defense raised was that
Lottie had been the owner of the fee and that all of her interest
now rested in the defendants because of a long period of adverse
possession." In arriving at a solution to the problem, the court
pointed out that one of the most familiar rules of construction
is one which requires that, when technical words are used, they
are to be given their usual technical meaning, unless the context
of the instrument involved manifests a contrary intent. Such
being the case, and there being no limitation or explanation of
the use of the term "Bodley Heirs" appearing in the deed, the
estate created was the usual common-law fee tail with its statu-
tory modification. As an adverse holding against a life tenant
can have no bearing on the rights of remaindermen until such
time as they are in a position to assert their interests,9 it followed
the heirs were entitled to the property.
Through the medium of the opinion in Northern Trust Com-
pany v. Cudahy,10 the court demonstrated how a well drafted
residuary clause in a will can serve to exercise any testamentary
powers of appointment of which the decedent may be donee,
despite the fact that such powers are not expressly mentioned in
the will itself. The court there reaffirmed and clarified prior hold-
ings" which had followed the rationale of Justice Story, in
Blagge v. Miles,12 to the effect that intention, "however mani-
fested, whether directly or indirectly, positively or by just impli-
cation, will make the execution" of the power valid and operative.
Taken by themselves, these last two decisions cannot be said
to be significant, startling, or novel. They do possess importance,
however, because the court concerned in each case illustrated a
capacity for reasonable analysis of constructional matters in the
8 The defendants relied on both the twenty-year statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,
Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 1, and on the one relating to seven years of adverse possession
under color of title, ibid., § 6.
9 Murch v. Epley, 385 Ill. 138, 52 N. E. (2d) 125 (1944).
10339 Il. App. 603, 91 N. E. (2d) 607 (1950).
11 Rettig v. Zander, 364 Ill. 112, 4 N. E. (2d) 30 (1936) ; Funk v. Eggleston, 92
Ill. 515 (1879).
12 1 Story 426 at 427, Fed. Cas. No. 1479 (1841).
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rather esoteric field of future interests. That fact offers hope
that the Illinois courts, by reverting to first principles, may be dis-
playing a maturing perception of the policy issues involved in
a field of law which has been subjected to grave abuse in recent
years.
Problems are likely to arise in connection with the execution
of a contract for the sale of land or the duty to make a conveyance
thereof. In Hanlon v. Hayes,13 the plaintiff sought specific per-
formance of an alleged contract of sale only to be met with a
defense based on the Statute of Frauds.14 The defendant relied
on the fact that the contract, even if operating as a memorandum,
did not contain any mention of price. 15 The plaintiff replied that,
because of Section 3 of the statute, 16 price was not a necessary
element in a contract of this sort. In the absence of Illinois cases
directly in point, but on the basis of decisions in other jurisdictions
and as a matter of statutory construction, the court sustained the
defense. It is in connection with this latter aspect that the case
takes on the greatest interest. At the beginning of legislation in
this field, price was treated as an essential part of every contract
covered by the statute.' 7  That requirement caused undue hard-
ship in commercial activities, so the English Parliament later re-
voked the provision insofar as it related to sales of personalty.
The Illinois legislature followed suit by enacting what is the
present Section 3 of the Illinois Statute of Frauds, with its refer-
ence to extrinsic proof of the consideration for an "promise' or
"agreement." Section 1 thereof, which deals with sales of per-
sonalty, speaks of "promises" and "agreements." In contrast,
Section 2, covering sales of realty, refers to "contracts of sale."
On the basis of this distinction in terminology, the court treated
13404 Ill. 362, 89 N. E. (2d) 51 (1949).
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 59, § 2.
15 The contract produced in evidence disclosed a statement of the price agreed
upon, but the master found that the contract had been signed in blank on the
understanding that the price was to be filled in later on, after it had been agreed
upon.
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 59, § 3, declares: "The consideration of any
promise or agreement need not be set forth or expressed in the writing, but may
be proved or disproved by parol or other legal evidence."
17 See 29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677).
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Section 3 as operating to qualify Section 1 only. By reason of
that analysis, the law in Illinois is now settled that a statement
of price is a necessary element to every enforcible contract for
the sale of real estate.
The decision in Margulus v. Mathes"s reaffirms a rule which
is to the effect that if a purchaser agrees, by the terms of his con-
tract, to pay cash, he must do just that. The vendor had there
refused to accept a certified check at the time fixed for the clos-
ing of the deal and the court held, in a suit for specific perform-
ance brought by the vendee, that the vendor was within his rights
without regard to his motives in making such refusal. The pru-
dent purchaser had best take note to avoid what might be an
otherwise unsuspected pitfall.
It has been established a sufficient number of times so as
hardly to warrant citation 19 that a vendor who is unable to secure
a release of inchoate dower from his spouse cannot compel speci-
fic performance of a contract to sell realty if he has agreed to
deliver a merchantable title. For that reason, the case of Cities
Service Oil Company v. Viering20 is certain to cause comment
among the legal fraternity. The purchaser there sought and
obtained specific performance of a contract despite the fact that
the vendor's wife had refused to join in the agreement. To this
point, the case is analogous to other Illinois decisions 21 which have
allowed a purchaser to enforce a contract while taking some form
of restitution for that portion of the obligation which the vendor
is unable to perform. It is, however, well established that a pur-
chaser cannot obtain abatement of the purchase price in the event
the inability to provide full performance exists in the form of
an outstanding inchoate dower interest. 22 As a consequence, the
18339 Ill. App. 497, 90 N. E. (2d) 254 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REvmw 382.
19 See, for example, Pearson v. Adams, 394 Ill. 391, 68 N. E. (2d) 777 (1947)
Firebaugh v. Wittenberg, 309 Ill. 536, 141 N. E. 405 (1923).
20 404 Ill. 538, 89 N. E. (2d) 392 (1950).
21 See, for example, Moore v. Gariglietti, 228 Ill. 143, 81 N. E. 826 (1907).
where specific performance was decreed at the instance of the purchaser even
though the vendor could convey only 2/Sths of the land at stake.
22 Pearson v. Adams, 394 Ill. 391, 68 N. E. (2d) 777 (1947) ; Firebaugh v. Witten-
berg, 309 Ill. 536, 141 N. E. 405 (1923) ; Rost v. Kremin, 308 Ill. 79, 139 N. E. 11
(1923).
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plaintiff was there forced to pay the full purchase price and was
left to rely on the covenants as to title in the vendor's warranty
deed in case there should be a future eviction.
One cannot help but admire the extraordinary ingenuity of
counsel presenting the cause for the plaintiff in Pruitt Office
Machine Company v. Liberty National Bank of Chicago.2 3 The
plaintiff there concerned was a lessee under an agreement where-
by, in the event the lessor chose to sell the premises, the lessor
could, upon six months' notice, regain possession of the premises
although he would be obliged to pay the lessee a substantial sum.
Such a sale did occur approximately a year and a half prior to
the normal expiration of the leasehold interest. The plaintiff
then sought to impress an equitable lien on the property to secure
payment of the penalty. His theory was that, in giving up the
leasehold interest prematurely, the plaintiff was reconveying a
valuable real property right and, as vendor, had a right to a
vendor's lien to secure the payment of the unpaid purchase price.
Although the court could find no Illinois case in point, it seemed
to be well satisfied that the lessee had only a contractual right
to enforce, for the transaction did not call for a conveyance but
only a surrender. Allowance of damage for breach of contract
was deemed to be a sufficient remedy particularly since none of
the usual equitable considerations to support a lien were present.
The really impelling factor in this decision, however, would seem
to be the fact that it is well established law that where two parties
have agreed to restrict their claims against one another growing
out of a certain transaction to legal remedies, such a contract is
not illegal, fraudulent, or against public policy, hence neither
party can later seek to resort to an equitable proceeding to resolve
differences.
24
Lawyers practicing in counties where the Torrens system of
land registration is in operation should give particular note to
a series of cases involving registered lands, for uncertainty ap-
23 341 Ill. App. 146, 93 N. E. (2d) 104 (1950).
24 An analogous situation may be found in the general refusal of courts to grant
specific performance where the contract contains a liquidated damage clause: 49
Am. Jur., Specific Performance, §§ 43-5.
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pears to be developing over the question as to the nature of the
interests which must be registered. In one case, that of Miller
v. Frederick's Brewing Company,25 the registered titleholder,
being the grantee of one who had previously given a registered
mortgage on the property, filed a proceeding in ejectment to re-
cover possession of the premises. He offered the Torrens cer-
tificate as conclusive evidence of his right to judgment. 2  The
defendant, in turn, relied on an actual possession obtained from
the original mortgagee who had, prior to plaintiff's grant, en-
tered into possession with permission after default in the mort-
gage but who had later surrendered such possession, together
with the unpaid mortgage note, to defendant as transferree.
Defendant's rights, as an equitable mortgagee in possession, did
not specifically appear on the Torrens register but there was a
registered memorial as to the existence of the ancient mortgage
27
under which defendant held. Such memorial was regarded as
being adequate to defeat the grantee's legal action for possession
against one in peaceful possession for the purpose of collecting
the mortgage debt.
In another case, that of People v. Mortenson,28 the plaintiff
had purchased registered property at a tax sale under a decree
which authorized the sale and provided that if no redemption was
made within two years and the purchaser had complied with
certain provisions of the Revenue Act,29 the purchaser was to
be entitled to a deed. Upon expiration of the redemption period,
the plaintiff demanded a deed, but the county clerk refused to
issue one because of a non-compliance with Section 82 of the
Torrens ActA0 The plaintiff asserted that as the provisions of
25405 Ill. 591, 92 N. E. (2d) 108 (1950), affirming 337 Ill. App. 650, 86 N. E.
(2d) 272 (1949), abst. opin.
26 111. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 88.
27 The court held that as the original mortgagee had gone into possession within
twenty years after default, the right to exercise the privileges of a mortgage in
possession was not barred by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § llb. See Brown
v. Bookstaver, 141 Ill. 461, 31 N. E. 17 (1892).
28404 Ill. 107, 88 N. E. (2d) 35 (1949), noted in 28 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW REvI w
277.
29 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 747.
30 Ibid., Ch. 30, § 119. This section requires, among other things, that the
holder of a certificate of sale of registered lands must register the certificate
CHICAGO-KENT LA 11 REVIEW
the Revenue Act were complete and independent of the Torrens
Act, and as the latter referred only to annual tax sales and said
nothing about tax foreclosures, he was not required to comply
with the latter or any other statute. The court treated the stat-
utes as a whole, rather than piecemeal, on the theory they com-
plemented each other, and pointed to the fact that a document
which does not comply with the requirements of the Torrens Act
may not be registered as ground for denying relief. It made
short shrift of the allegations that the decree of sale alone was
controlling by noting that the decree did stipulate that the title
to the land was registered. Such being the case, the Torrens Act
itself operated to notify all persons dealing with registered land
to see to it that all provisions thereof were complied with if the
transaction was to have any effect.
The case of Interstate Bond Company v. Baran3' provides an
interesting supplement to the preceding case for the tax buyer
there, having secured a deed, sought to force its registration on
a register of titles who had refused to accept the deed because
of a somewhat similar defect.3 2  The plaintiff proceeded on the
theory that the registrar was under a positive ministerial duty to
accept and register the tax deed without examination into its
legal sufficiency or, if not, that Section 82 of the Torrens Act
was unconstitutional. He, too, failed in his attempt. The court
indicated that the first issue, one concerning the registrar's duties,
had been fully discussed in the case of People ex rel. Dineen v.
Simon,33 where it had been established that his duties were quasi-
judicial in nature so that, while he might not adjudicate disputes
as to title, he at least had to inquire into the legal sufficiency of
documents presented for registration.3 4  The claim of unconsti-
tutionality was based on the idea that Section 82 of the Torrens
within one year from the date of the sale. The court refused to see any distinction,
under this section, between a tax foreclosure and an annual tax sale, hence this
claim played little part in the decision of the case.
31406 Ill. 161, 92 N. E. (2d) 658 (1950).
32 The plaintiff there concerned had failed to notify all persons in interest that
he had registered his certificate of sale within one year: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol.
1, Ch. 30, § 119.
33 176 Ill. 165, 52 N. E. 910 (1898).
34 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 45, and Vol. 2, Ch. 115, § 9.
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Act had amended Section 266 of the Revenue Act 85 without setting
forth the amended section at length as is required by the state
constitution." No constitutional issue had been urged in the
Mortenson case, but the court felt that the opinion therein had
satisfactorily disposed of the problem by establishing that these
two acts were complementary rather than one amendatory of the
other. To this point, no uncertainty in the principles underlying
the Torrens system would seem to have developed. The next case,
however, strikes off on a new track.
It is plain law that an easement of way by implication may
arise when a common owner creates a right of way over his land
and then sells a portion of the property to a grantee who needs
must use the right of way in order to have access to the part so
purchased.3 7 The existence or non-existence of a recorded grant
of such an easement privilege is generally deemed immaterial
for the nature of the privilege is usually apparent to the eye.
For that reason, the physical condition of the premises is cus-
tomarily regarded as providing common law notice of the ex-
istence of the encumbrance to a subsequent purchaser of the servi-
ent estate. The picture becomes clouded, however, when the title
to the two parcels is registered under the Torrens System and
no memorial concerning the presence of the easement appears
on the Torrens register, for claims intended to affect the title to
registered land should there appear.3 8  The defendants in Carter
v. Michael, 9 relying upon the state of the Torrens register, ac-
quired the supposed servient estate and thereafter fenced the
same so as to exclude plaintiffs, who had previously become own-
ers of the alleged dominant property, from their claimed right
of passage. A decree commanding removal of the obstruction
35 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 747.
36 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 13, reads in part: "... no law shall be revived or
amended by reference to its title only, but the law revived, or the section amended,
shall be inserted at length in the new act."
37 Bihss v. Sabolis, 322 Ill. 350, 153 N. E. 684, 53 A. L. R. 907 (1926).
38 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 84. See also Balzer v. Pyles, 350 Ill. 344,
183 N. E. 215 (1932).
39 403 Ill. 610, 87 N. E. (2d) 759 (1949). Crampton, J., wrote a dissenting opin-
ion predicated on the belief that the supposed easement was not "necessary" to
the enjoyment of the dominant estate, hence should have been expressly granted
or reserved.
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was affirmed by the Supreme Court on the ground that there is
nothing in the Torrens Act which bars the possibility of the
existence of an implied easement. If common law notice arising
from the fact of exclusive possession by the holder of an un-
registered contract to purchase is inapplicable in the case of
registered lands, 40 it is difficult to see why the same principle
should not apply to even less important unregistered interests.
The decision would appear to have done much to unsettle the
primary thesis of the Torrens system, to-wit: the register is every-
thing and only registerable interests should appear thereon.41
Only one case established anything of significance with re-
spect to ownership of personal property, but it was a case pos-
sessing a tremendous impact on the law as well as on a fairly
common practice. By affirming the Appellate Court holding in
the case of In re Wilson's Estate,42 the Supreme Court made it
clear that the typical joint-tenancy lease of a safety deposit box
is not sufficient to establish a joint tenancy, with right of sur-
vivorship, over the contents but that some other written evidence
of the joint title must exist if such survivorship rights are to
be enjoyed. A signed memorandum found in the safety deposit
box involved in that case was also deemed insufficient for the
purpose, apparently because lacking in operative words of trans-
fer. The court did not reach the question whether, to be com-
pletely effective, there must be an observance of the same four
unities as is required in every joint tenancy interest in real es-
tate, but there is enough in the case, and in prior and current
history,43 to induce a belief that the creation of a joint tenancy
in personal property must be as formal an act as is required in
the case of a joint tenancy in real estate.
40 Bjornberg v. Myers, 212 II. App. 257 (1918).
41 Fels v. Knowles, 26 New Zeal. L. 604; Mordaunt's Assignee v. Gibson, 33 New
Zeal. L. 1423; Cooke v. Union Bank, 14 N. S. Wales L. R. Eq. 280.
42404 Ill. 207, 88 N. E. (2d) 662 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
258-64, 38 I1. B. J. 228. 45 Ill. L. Rev. 285, affirming, 336 Ill. App. 18, 82 N. E.
(2d) 684 (1948), noted in 38 II1. B. J. 93.
43 In David v. Ridgely-Farmers Safe Deposit Co., 342 Ill. App. 96, 95 N. E. (2d)
725 (1950), not in the period of this survey, the Appellate Court for the Third
District expressed the view that the traditional unities are essential, as well
as a further condition that the instrument conveying title must specifically provide
for the right of survivorship.
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Novelty in law, at least so far as Illinois is concerned, ap-
pears in three recent bailment cases. In the first, that of Prince
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,44 a carrier was held liable for
injury to dairy livestock being transported by it arising from
a failure to milk the cows while en route, despite an oral re-
quest by the shipper that such care be provided. Reliance was
placed, by the bailee, on a provision in the shipping tariff, to the
effect that instructions "when given in writing or plainly marked
on the container" were to be complied with, as indicating that
no duty attached in the absence of any written instruction. The
court held that it was, nevertheless, the duty of the carrier to
anticipate and guard against all those natural consequences which
might occur in the course of transportation, even though no spe-
cial charge was made nor any special written instruction given
concerning the extra service. ' 5 In the second case, on the other
hand, that of Berg v. Schreiber,46 evidence of a failure to pro-
vide written notice of loss caused the Illinois Supreme Court to
favor the carrier on the ground that mere knowledge of the loss
is not enough but that the same must be brought to the attention
of the carrier in the form stipulated for, and within the time
fixed, in the bill of lading.4 7 The third case, that of Kassvaln v.
Thomas F. McElroy Company, s was a suit against a consignee
based on the theory that a breach of his duty had occurred, pro-
ductive of the loss suffered, in returning the goods by common
carrier at only a nominal value instead of at full valuation. The
court concluded that, in the absence of specific instruction, tUe
consignee was entitled to follow the path of conduct used by the
consignor when making the initial shipment, since the consignor
had thereby fixed the measure of what it considered to be a rea-
sonable degree of care for the bailed property.
44341 Ill. App. 236, 93 N. E. (2d) 102 (1950).
4513 C. J. S., Carriers, § 63(a).
46405 Il1. 528, 92 N. E. (2d) 88 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAw RnVIEW
359-64, affirming 337 Ill. App. 477, 86 N. E. (2d) 125 (1949).
47 An almost opposite result was attained by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Sev-
enth Circuit, in Hopper Paper Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 178 F. (2d) 179
(1949), on the theory that the stipulation as to notice of loss was addressed to a
practical exigency, hence should be construed in a practical way.
48179 F. (2d) 97 (1950), noted in 28 CMCAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 355-9.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT
Rarely is an Illinois court so impressed with the decision
of a court of a sister state that it quotes such decision in full to
sustain its own position, but such was the fact in the only land-
lord-tenant suit of any importance. In Kenny v. Thompson,
4 9
the Appellate Court for the First District, relying on the Mary-
land case of Tudor Arms Apartments v. Shaffer,50 held that the
owner of shares of stock in a cooperative apartment building was
not precluded from maintaining an action to evict the defendant
tenant. The federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947 gave to a
landlord the right to recover possession, subject to local law,
where he desired occupancy for his own purposes. 51 The case
has now established the doctrine that the privilege extends to
members of cooperative housing organizations, even though the
title to the premises is vested in a corporation, which corpora-
tion is the nominal landlord.
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
Aside from points already noted, 52 the only cases in the realm
of security transactions which proved to be of interest dealt,
primarily, with the question of whether or not the particular con-
tract at issue was truly a security device or merely an agree-
ment for some other form of legal relationship. In Brust v.
Brust,53 for example, a son had contracted to meet the mortgage
payments on the family farm in exchange for an agreement on
the part of his parents to will the farm to him. As each pay-
ment was made, the father gave the son a note to cover the
amount of such installment. The mother died and the father
later remarried. The father, after unsuccessfully trying to buy
49338 Ill. App. 403, 87 N. E. (2d) 229 (1949), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REWIW 151-6.
50- Md. -, 62 A. (2d) 346 (1948).
51 50 U. S. C. A., Appendix, § 1881 et seq.
52 See ante, under the heading of Real and Personal Property, for a discussion
of Miller v. Frederick's Brewing Co., 405 Ill. 591, 92 N. E. (2d) 108 (1950), dealing
with the rights of a mortgagee in possession of registered lands where no affirmative
action to foreclose would be permitted because the debt was barred by limitation.
53 405 Iil. 132, 89 N. E. (2d) 897 (1950).
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back the contract,54 willed the farm to his second wife. The son
then sought specific performance of the contract by having the
will set aside insofar as it affected the family farm. The sec-
ond wife, after tender of the amount of principal and interest
laid out by the son, asked to have the contract cancelled as be-
ing no more than a mortgage.55 The court, deciding for the son,
held that the nature of the contract had to be established on the
basis of the intention of the parties at the time it was entered into,
and considered it was a good contract to make a will.56 The notes
given by the father were treated as being no more than evidence
of payment, intended to establish satisfactory performance by the
son according to the tenor of his agreement rather than, by some
retroactive process, to create a mortgage relationship.
By way of contrast, the grantor, in Miller v. Allen,57 deeded
land to the defendant, a former tenant, in consideration of a
down payment and an agreement to make monthly payments
until a specified sum had been paid or the grantor had died,
whichever occurred first.58 The grantor died not long after the
conveyance and the executor of the grantor's estate sought to
foreclose, alleging that the mortgage provision regarding dis-
charge in case of death was an invalid attempted testamentary
disposition. 59 With no Illinois case directly in point on which to
rely, the court chose to follow the usual ruling applied in analog-
ous situations, frequently involving parents and children, where
it has been held that a vendor who sells land on installments
payable until the full price has been met or the vendor has died,
whichever occurs first, is engaged in a contractual rather than a
54 He was unsuccessful because he refused to offer anything near the amount
the son had paid out on the mortgage.
55 The defendant relied on the fact that the son had demanded and received a
note covering each payment, as well as upon the subsequent negotiation to release
the contract, as indication that the agreement was essentially a mortgage.
56 Such contracts are recognized in Illinois: In re Johnson's Estate, 389 Ill. 425,
59 N. E. (2d) 825 (1945) ; Henson v. Neuman, 286 Ill. App. 197, 3 N. E. (2d) 110
(1936).
57 339 Ill. App. 471, 90 N. E. (2d) 251 (1950). Leave to appeal has been denied.
58 The sum agreed upon represented no more than principal, for the debt was
declared to be interest free.
59 The instrument was not witnessed in conformity with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol.
1, Ch. 3, § 194.
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testamentary transaction." One cannot help but be persuaded
that the correct result was reached.
Again, the nature of the agreement was of substantial im-
portance in determining the rights of the parties in the case of
In re Scheribel's Estate.6 1 A decedent, prior to death, had there
deeded property to the defendant corporation and had contracted
to buy it back under a repurchase agreement. Thereafter, while
the sole devisee was non compos mentis, the administrator as-
signed the rights under the contract. Shortly after the sole de-
visee was restored to civil status, he brought an action to set
aside the transaction and to surcharge the administrator. The
defense was that the action should fail as it amounted to a col-
lateral attack on the jurisdiction of the probate court which had
approved the original sale. The prime transaction between the
decedent and the defendant corporation, in reality, had been a
masked security device, was nothing more than a mortgage, and
the purported assignment was an attempt to cut off the equity
of redemption. That being so, the administrator was adjudged
to have no authority to deal with the real property interest
62
and the probate court judgment was open to collateral attack for
lack of jurisdiction. It might be observed that the cases dis-
cussed thus far provide further illustration of the folly of en-
tering into financial transactions without competent advice or,
conversely, of trying to mask the true nature of the agreement.
Either alternative breeds litigation with its consequence of ex-
pense and delay.
The case of Fohrman v. Laird63 provides a fascinating exam-
ple of the inter-relationship which exists among the several stat-
utes of limitation. A husband and wife had signed a mortgage
which matured in 1935. The wife had died in 1943 and the hus-
60 See cases listed in annotation in 127 A. L. R. 628.
61340 Ill. App. 238, 91 N. E. (2d) 443 (1950).
62 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 379, authorizes the personal representative
to sell real estate only in the event it is necessary to do so in order to discharge
debts of the estate, and then only after the personal estate has been exhausted.
No allegation of that character was made or established in the instant case.
63 338 Ill. App. 393, 87 N. E. (2d) 235 (1949).
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band died in 1946. The mortgagee, seeking foreclosure, joined
all concerned in a suit begun in 1947. The defense for the hus-
band's estate was that, as no claim had been filed within the
nine-month period following probate, 64 the estate could no longer
be held liable. This defense was held to be good. The wife's
estate had never been probated but, on her side of the case, the
defense raised was that of the ten-year period of limitation. 5
Since her estate had never been probated, her property was sub-
ject to claims for a period of seven years after her death, 6 hence
the present foreclosure action was considered to be timely. Of
course, so long as the claim was valid as to one of two joint
makers, the lien of the mortgage was enforcible in an in rem
action despite the fact that the other joint maker had been ab-
solved from personal liability. One's rights may seem to be
barred by one section of the statute of limitations, but the action
might still be prosecuted under another.
Not so fortunate, from the mortgagee 's standpoint, was the
outcome of the case of Lowenstein v. Chicago Title & Trust Com-
pany.67 It has been said that indirect attack may sometimes pro-
duce results not open to accomplishment by a direct frontal as-
sault. That maxim must have been in the mind of the plaintiff
there concerned for, finding that direct foreclosure of a mort-
gage was no longer possible because suit on the debt was barred,
he attempted to accomplish the same result by using certain un-
satisfied and operative judgments against the guarantors of the
mortgage debt as the basis for his attempted foreclosure. The
mortgage had originally been given by the trustee under a land
trust and the trustee had adequately prevented the rise of per-
sonal liability on the debt by apt limitation confining the mort-
gagee's right to foreclose the lien and no more. The lender had
insisted upon the personal guarantee of those beneficially inter-
ested in the trust and had, on default, taken judgment against
64 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 356.
65 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 11.
66 That period has been established by judicial construction. For a case dis-
cussing the Illinois decisions on this matter, see In re Estate of Levy, 335 Ill. App.
367, 82 N. E. (2d) 209 (1948). Leave to appeal denied.
67340 Ill. App. 160, 91 N. E. (2d) 96 (1950).
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them, which judgment had been revived from time to time.68
He then claimed that the unreleased mortgage stood as security
for such judgment and, as the guarantors were alleged to be the
equitable owners of the mortgaged premises, he asserted the right
to foreclose against such equitable interest under the land trust.
The legal and equitable title had, in the meantime, become vested
in certain purchasers who, as defendants, moved to dismiss the
suit. A decree of dismissal was affirmed when the Appellate,
Court for the First District, noting the novelty in the situation,
concluded that the guarantors, while being beneficiaries under
the land trust, actually held no more than a personal property
interest therein,6 9 which interest did not become encumbered by
the mortgage or the judgment based thereon and had passed
freely to the purchasers who had also acquired the now unencum-
bered legal title of the trustee. The court distinguished the
situation before it from that arising where the guarantors had,
in fact, gained an equitable interest in the mortgaged premises. 7
TRUSTS
What started out to be an interesting and a rather novel at-
tempt to erect a constructive trust was thwarted by the deci-
sion of the Appellate Court in the case of Ordahl v. Johnson.71
The complaint filed there alleged that plaintiff's aunt, for a
cash consideration, executed a bill of sale to plaintiff, her niece,
covering certain rugs, pictures, jewelry, silver, and other fur-
nishings, on the niece's oral agreement that the property so sold
should remain in the aunt's apartment so long as the aunt wished
to keep the same there. The complaint also averred that the aunt's
administrator, some seven years later, took possession of the
property upon the aunt's death and refused to deliver it up.
Plaintiff sought a decree to the effect that the administrator was
68 The court held, on the authority of Thompson & Thompson v. Brown, 121 Mo.
App. 524, 97 S. W. 242 (1906), that part payment by one guarantor did not revive
the obligation of the other guarantors since they were not joint makers.
69 Marshall v. Solomon, 335 I1. App. 302, 81 N. E. (2d) 777 (1948); Chicago
Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Savings Bank, 300 Il1. App. 329, 20 N. E.
(2d) 992 (1939).
70 See Burt v. Gage, 50 S. D. 208, 208 N. W. 985 (1926).
71 341 Iln. App. 277, 93 N. E. (2d) 377 (1950).
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a constructive trustee of the property. The complaint was dis-
missed, and the higher court affirmed the decision, on the basis
that no constructive trust could arise, as the case was not one
wherein a person had acquired title to property either by fraud
or by abuse of a confidential relationship. The mere fact that
a person who has acquired no more than possession may be un-
der a duty of restitution is not enough to make him chargeable
as a constructive trustee, 72 for other adequate legal remedies
exist to take care of the situation.
Duties and liabilities of trustees were considered in two cases.
In Piff v. Beresheim,73 the court announced and followed a well-
accepted rule to the effect that a successor trustee is not liable
to the beneficiaries for a breach of trust committed by his prede-
cessor, although he can be held for his own breach of trust oc-
curring after he has succeeded to the office of trustee. In the
other case, that of Victor v. Hillebrecht,7 4 the issue was one as to
whether or not trust managers of a liquidation trust were en-
titled to purchase beneficial trust participation certificates and
to retain the profits derived from such purchases. The ques-
tion was answered in the affirmative by the Supreme Court on
the basis of the instrument and the facts before it. The court
recognized the general rule that a trustee is not free to pur-
chase from himself and at his own sale, but emphasized that most
of the cases which apply that rule deal with instances where the
trustee has purchased an encumbrance upon or claim against the
trust property or is placed in a position of holding an interest
adverse to the beneficiary. In the case before it, the trustees
had purchased outstanding interests belonging to other benefi-
ciaries on the open market but were being sued by those who
remained certificate holders and who stood to gain handsomely
from the acts of the trustees. Because the trustees had no power
to control the sale of the participation certificates, and had not
placed themselves in any adverse position to the trust, being cer-
72 Restatement, Restitution, Ch. 1, § 4.
73 405 i. 617, 92 N. E. (2d) 113 (1950).
74405 Ill. 264, 90 N. E. (2d) 751 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW RE;viw
379, reversing 339 Ill. App. 254, 90 N. E. (2d) 270 (1950). Certiorari has been
denied: 339 U. S. 980, 70 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. (adv.) 921 (1950).
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tificate holders from the start, no violation of duty was said
to have occurred.
The decision is a regrettable one, however, for it sacrifices
one of the most fundamental principles in the law of trusts on
the altar of convenience, seemingly dictated by the facts of the
individual case. It fails to take into consideration the fact
that the trustees, by acquiring a sufficient number of trust cer-
tificates, could actually become owners of a sufficient percentage
to prevent a sale of the trust property, in which case they could
then well hold a position adverse to the interests of the rest of
the beneficiaries. It is precisely such dangers which prompted
Justice Cardozo to declare: "Uncompromising rigidity has been
the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the
rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of par-
ticular exceptions . . . Only thus has the level of conduct for
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the
crowd. "1
75
Trust termination, even by mutual consent of all interested
parties, may entail grave difficulties. In Fenske v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society,76 the holder of a life insurance policy entered
into an irrevocable trust agreement which required the trustee
to divide the policy proceeds equally among the settlor's chil-
dren but, if any beneficiary had died before distribution occurred,
the beneficiary's share was to be paid as the deceased beneficiary
may have directed by will or, in default thereof, to the descend-
ants of the deceased beneficiary. The policy lapsed during the
lifetime of the settlor, and a request was made to the insurance
company for payment of the cash surrender value. The company
agreed to pay provided it was furnished with releases from "all
parties in interest." At that time, the settlor had four adult
children and six grandchildren, one of whom was a minor. None
of the grandchildren joined in the release. The insurance com-
pany refused to pay the surrender value and the Appellate Court
sustained that position. It pointed out that, where all parties
interested in a trust fund are sui juris, the beneficiaries may con-
75 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458 at 464, 164 N. E. 545 at 546, 62 A. L. R.
1 (1928).
76 340 Ill. App. 58, 91 N. E. (2d) 465 (1950).
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sent to a termination of the trust and a distribution of the fund,
but that this rule is not applicable where there are contingent in-
terests or where the interests of minors are involved.
Of a somewhat similar nature was the case of Waller v.-
Waller77 one in which the surrender of life insurance policies
was also at issue but with a new angle, to-wit: the existence or
possible appearance of irrevocably designated secondary bene-
ficiaries. A wife had there taken out life insurance policies pay-
able irrevocably, in equal shares, to her husband and her chil-
dren or to the surviving issue of any deceased child per stirpes.
The wife later created a trust and assigned the policies to the
trustees, one of whom was apparently her husband. The trus-
tees, claiming ownership by virtue of the assignment, applied
for the cash surrender value of the policies and were met with
a refusal based on the absence of any reserved right to make a
change in the designated beneficiaries. Suit to recover the sur-
render value was defeated on the ground that it could not be
made to appear whether all of the persons interested in the poli-
cies were in being or had been made parties to the suit. As the
grandchildren of the insured, born and unborn, were irrevocably
made beneficiaries under the policies in question, their valuable
property interests could not be divested except by due process
of law. Not being made parties, nor being represented by par-
ties having an identity of interest, for the minor beneficiaries had
interests conflicting with those of the parents and the trustees,
the court was without power to bring the trust to an end.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
Despite the paucity of cases, 78 some areas in the law of wills
and administration received clarification. In Gowling v. Gow-
ling7 9 the widow asserted her statutory right to renounce the
77 341 Ill. App. 204, 93 N. E. (2d) 113 (1950).
78 See ante, under the heading of Security Transactions, for a discussion of
Miller v. Allen, 339 Ill. App. 471, 90 N. E. (2d) 251 (1950), wherein it was held
that a mortgage provision calling for payments against principal until the indebted-
ness was discharged or the mortgagee died, whichever occurred first, was not a
testamentary disposition so as to require compliance with factors necessary for
a good will.
79405 Il. 165, 90 N. E. (2d) 188 (1950), noted in 28 CU-OAGO-KENT LAW RlvEw
382.
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will ° and claimed a one-third interest in each parcel of real es-
tate involved in the estate8 ' as a portion of her statutory forced
share. The specific devisees contended that they had a right to
restitution from the residuary estate to the extent their devise
was thus abated. They were of the opinion that the testator, by
making specific devises, had intended them to take a specific por-
tion of his estate, regardless of subsequent factors which might
affect other interests under the same will. It was thought that
the usual rules for abatement, utilized where an estate is in-
sufficient to cover debts, administration expenses and legacies,
were applicable to the situation at bar. 2  Despite the fact that
there would appear to be no case directly in point,83 the court
was not impressed with the suggested logic and concluded that
the pertinent section of the Probate Act 4 was sufficiently ex-
plicit in language to eliminate any variation from its express
terms because of any professed intention on the part of the
testator.
Incidentally, if the court had sustained the rationale of the
specific devisees in that case, future testators would have been
placed in a position where it would have been possible to cir-
cumvent the beneficient policy of the legislation in question. The
surviving spouse could be forced into the position of having to
take either the meager provision of the will or of having to elect
to take against the will and thereby deprive the residuary lega-
tees or devisees of a substantial portion or perhaps all of their
potential inheritance, because such residuary interests would be
subordinated to those of the specific devisees and legacies. If,
in such a case, the residuary beneficiaries were children of the
80 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 169.
81 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 168.
s2 It should be noted that the section of the Probate Act providing for the
equalizing of legacies in the event of a renunciation does not apply to devises of
real estate: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §202; Dunshee v. Dunshee, 263 Ill.
188, 104 N. E. 1100 (1914).
83 The specific devisees had relied on Pace v. Pace, 271 Ill. 114, 110 N. E. 878
(1915), but the court refused to follow the authority and the holding of that case
because it had been decided under the older statute, one which differed from Sec-
tion 16 of the present law.
84 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 168, provides that, upon renunciation, the
surviving spouse's share shall consist of one-third, or one-half if no descendants, of
"each parcel of real estate of which the testator died seized."
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marriage and the specific beneficiaries were persons of no con-
sequence to the surviving spouse, the determination to renounce
the will or not would be a hard one, indeed, to make.
Something of the converse to the Gowling case arose in the
case of In re Estate of Phelps.8 5 The testator there had left his
property in trust to pay specific sums to certain beneficiaries with
the stipulation that if the fund proved to be insufficient to meet
such payments each gift was to abate proportionately. In fact,
there was a surplus. The question then became one as to whether
or not the surplus should be treated as intestate property. Again,
no Illinois case in point could be found, but the court was fully
satisfied that the surplus property was undisposed-of property
and, as a consequence, had to go by way of intestate succession.
There is ample analogy in comparable situations to attest to the
soundness of the decision,8 6 but the moral is that a competent
draftsman would have anticipated the contingency and would have
made adequate provision for it.
The case of Kessler v. Martinson. 7 presents quite a different
problem, and it is suspected that this decision ought to pro-
vide whatever clarification is needed regarding the time restric-
tions which the law has placed on the right to contest a will.
From the facts of that case it would appear that decedent's
brother had died about six months after the date of decedent's
death. The plaintiff, executor of the deceased brother's estate,
filed a suit to contest the decedent's will some seven months after
his testator's death and shortly after his appointment as exec-
utor, but the suit was not begun until more than fourteen months
after the death of the decedent. A motion to dismiss the action
was sustained by the trial court and the holding was affirmed
on appeal. It was there pointed out that matters of probate are
85 339 Il1. App. 304, 89 N. E. (2d) 833 (1950).
86 See Dahmer v. Wensler, 350 Ill. 23, 182 N. E. 799, 94 A. L. R. 1 (1933)
Minkler v. Simons, 172 Ill. 323, 50 N. E. 176 (1898). The court chose to rely on
the reasoning of In re Seay's Estate, 180 Cal. 304, 181 P. 58 (1919), because com-
parable language had been used in the will there considered.
87339 Ill. App. 207, 89 N. E. (2d) 735 (1949), noted in 28 CMCAGo-KENT LAW
REVIEW 177. See also ante, under the heading of Security Transactions, for a
discussion of Fohrman v. Laird, 338 Ill. App. 393, 87 N. E. (2d) 235 (1949), con-
cerning the application of the statute of limitations to claims against an estate.
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completely statutory for there is no inherent common-law right
to contest a will. Consequently, any action to contest a will must
conform to the statute. Section 90 of the Probate Act s8 places
a time restriction of nine months on the right to contest. As
this provision is a statute of repose rather than one of limitation,
none of the saving provisions of the general chapter on limita-
tions" can be deemed to modify it in any way. The court felt
constrained, therefore, to hold that there could be no redress,
regardless of circumstances, 90 if a timely suit was not filed.
Little quarrel can be had with the decision, despite its seeming
harshness, for it is most desirable, both from the standpoint of
the interested parties and of general public policy, to administer
a decedent's estate with as much dispatch as is possible.
(To be continued.)
88 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 242.
89 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 20.
90 See, for example, Marvin v. Bassford, 381 Ill. 569, 46 N. E. (2d) 366 (1943),
where even the newly-appointed conservator of an insane heir was not allowed to
institute a contest after the nine-month period had expired.
